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The Boeing 767 Tanker Boondoggle: How
the Corporate- Sales-Pitch Procurement




Corruption has been said to inhere in the military arms/government
contracting trade.1 Even so, as military contract scandals go, the recent
Boeing KC-767 tanker boondoggle has established some new parameters
for abuse of public money and trust, revealing an extensive pattern of
conflict-of-interest riddled mismanagement of government contract
awards, the dimensions of which are still emerging.2 In sum, both
criminal and ethics investigations have concluded that Boeing received
special treatment in the procurement process with the KC-767 deal, one
this article will characterize as the "corporate sales pitch procurement
regime." 3
* B.A., The Pennsylvania State University, 1976, J.D., The University of
Baltimore School of Law, 2004. A former manager in the domestic and international
airline industry, the author also functioned as a research assistant for Prof. Charles Tiefer,
former Assistant Solicitor and Deputy General Counsel to the House of Representatives
and an authority on government contract law, during his law school career. That
juxtaposition of backgrounds tended to fuse and focus his interests on the current topic at
hand.
The author acknowledges Prof. Tiefer's learned guidance and mentoring in
developing this article.
The author also acknowledges the patient assistance of his editor, Tiffany Richards.
1. ANTHONY SAMPSON, THE ARMS BAZAAR: FROM LEBANON TO LOCKHEED (Viking
Press, 1977) (a complete historical monograph of the military armaments trade, in
particular covering the 1976 Lockheed bribery scandal whose revelations rocked the
governments of both the Netherlands and Japan. Sampson concludes that the
international arms trade is largely a product of a "desperate" economic competition
requiring official bribery and corruption for growth and support.)
2. Renae Merle and Jerry Markon, Ex-Air Force Official Gets Prison Time, WASH.
POST, Oct. 2, 2004, at Al. According to the Washington Post, investigations continue to
target Marvin R. Sambur, Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisitions.
3. Id.
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Therefore, to fully explore what some scholars have called the
"unique culture ' 4 of government military contracting in the context of
aircraft procurement and how the politicized the atmosphere surrounding
the corporate-sales-pitch procurement regime eventually played to
Boeing's detriment, the following discussion offers a brief history and
contextual study in contrasts, juxtaposing Boeing's struggling KC-767
tanker program against that of its main competitor, EADS.5
This historical overview of the politicized nature of the Boeing
tanker proposal, and contrasting study of the EADS tanker-the
MRTT-and the procurement process in the United Kingdom will
establish: 1) the value of an openly competitive bidding regime in
aircraft procurement generally developed along infrastructural "multi-
use" lines, a regime the Department of Defense has already endorsed in
the full-scale engineering and development context for fighter aircraft;
6
and 2) why Boeing's lack of foresight and candor about the transaction
has already assured its loss of billions of international dollars to EADS's
infrastructural vision of adapting its commercial airframes to multiple
tanker and transport roles.
II. Background: Crisis Management-Boeing's Merger with Douglas,
the World Market for Commercial Aircraft After September 11,
2001, and Boeing's Failure in Head to Head Contract Competition
with Lockheed
The production and procurement of both civil and military aircraft is
a powerful international economic engine.7 That force, more focused
with the consolidation of Boeing and McDonnell-Douglas into a single
corporate entity, made Boeing the world's largest producer of both civil
4. CHARLES TIEFER & WILLIAM A. SHOOK, GOVERNMENT CONTRACT LAW 4
(Carolina Academic Press, 1999).
5. EADS is currently engaged in an aggressive sales campaign against Boeing to
market its MRTT (Multi-Role Tanker Transport) Airbus Industrie-airframe tanker
derivatives to the world's military market, in two configurations: one retrofitted on the
A310-300 fuselage, and the other retrofitted on the A330-200 fuselage. See European
Aeronautic Defence and Space Company, Press Releases, available at
http://www.eads.com/frame/lang/en/1024/xml/content/OFOOOOOO00400004/6/03/310000
36.html (last visited Sept. 29, 2004).
6. See Tom Ramstack, Boeing Demonstrates Airplane in Competition for Military
Contract, THE WASHINGTON TIMES, July 20, 2001.
7. By some accounts, aviation production is the largest single export industry in the
world, affecting up to eighty percent of the United States' economy alone. See David
Cantor, AIRCRAFT PRODUCTION AND THE UNITED STATES ECONOMY, in STAFF OF HOUSE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON TECHNOLOGY AND TRADE, 102nd Cong., AIRBUS INDUSTRIE: AN
ECONOMIC AND TRADE PERSPECTIVE 45 (1992). See also Daniel I. Fisher, "Super
Jumbo " Problem: Boeing, Airbus and the Battle for the Geopolitical Future, 35 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L. L. 865 (2002).
[Vol. 23:2
THE BOEING 767 TANKER BOONDOGGLE
and military aircraft.8 Boeing's acquisition of McDonnell was initially
fortuitous: not only did it come on the heels of adoption of the Uruguay
Round GATT accord, an agreement that left the question of
governmental subsidies for domestic civil aircraft production largely
untouched,9 it also presaged exponential growth of passenger traffic and
further consolidation in both the domestic and international airline
industry.10 In August 1997, when Boeing subsumed McDonnell-Douglas
into its operations, it had a huge backlog of orders for commercial
aircraft from booming domestic and international operators."
A. September 1 1 th Precipitated a Drop-Off in Commercial Orders
through Contract Rescission and Bankruptcy Filings
The tragedy of September 11, 2001, however, changed the boom to
a bust, leading to a complete collapse of the civil air transport market.
12
Other than at low-cost, short-haul niche carriers like Southwest and Jet
Blue, one hundred thousand airline employees lost their jobs as one
8. Boeing and former competitor McDonnell-Douglas agreed to merge into a single
company, called the Boeing Company, on December 15, 1996. At roughly the same
time, but in a separate transaction, Boeing also acquired much of Rockwell
International's aerospace and military contracting business. These two transactions
helped to ensure Boeing's preeminence in a global market in which its interests seem
much more directly adverse to those of European rival Airbus Industrie than ever before.
Patrick McGeehan, Succession Planning Takes a Back Seat in Turbulent Times, N.Y.
TIMEs, Dec. 2, 2003, at Cl (detailing the career of Boeing CEO Philip Condit, under
whose helm Boeing acquired McDonnell and completed the acquisition in August, 1997).
See Fisher, supra note 7.
9. See generally Fisher, supra note 7, for an extensive discussion of the contentious
nature of the GATT negotiations around the question of domestic subsidies for civil
aircraft manufacture, research and development, and a complete history and development
of GATT's impact on the competition between Boeing and Airbus Industrie in the
development of the next-generation, super-jumbo jet in particular.
10. Travel Set to Break Records in the Summer of 1998, TRAVEL AGENT, June 1,
1998, at 92 (referring in particular to the airlines' "blockbuster" summer of 1997 and the
prospects for even higher bookings in the summer of 1998).
11. Peter Robison, New Bottom Line: Retirement; Tough Exec Harry Stonecipher
Retires Today as Boeing's No. 2, THE SEATTLE TIMES, June 1, 2002, at C1. Stonecipher,
the former McDonnell Douglas CEO, arguably saved Boeing from post-merger disaster
by tough financial stewardship, "cleaning up" the backlog mess that cost Boeing nearly
$3 billion in production costs and charges; see also James Wallace, Boeing Threatened in
Congress Pleas for More Contracts, East Coast Layoffs Prompt a Vow to Ban Company
Lobbyists from Capitol Hill, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Dec. 14, 2001, at El
(discussing Boeing's backlog of orders for the MD-95-the stretched and redesigned
DC-9 Boeing rechristened the 717-it inherited from McDonnell Douglas, still an issue
after the collapse of the civil aviation industry precipitated by the events of September
11,2001).
12. See Jackie Thompson, Beneath the Turmoil, AIRLINE BuSINESS, Dec. 2001, at 99
(arguing that air transport after the events of September 11, 2001, descended into a "state
of near anarchy" where strategic management decisions were supplanted by "the need to
respond to a chain of uncontrollable and unpredictable events").
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major U.S. air carrier after another contemplated the spectra of
bankruptcy protection.' 3 The calamitous crash of the civil air transport
market washed across the entire world economy, particularly those
sectors either related or tangential to travel, 14 and Boeing's house
inevitably fell with it. With the exception of the 717 program,
production backlogs suddenly vanished as air carriers sought bankruptcy
protection to extricate themselves from binding aircraft lease and
purchase agreements.
15
In the wake of the post-9/11 depression in the airline and travel
industries, predictably, the commercial aircraft production line was the
next domino to fall, as airliners were retired in record numbers to storage
facilities in the Mojave and Sonora deserts.' 6  Having assimilated its
major U.S. competitor, with double its pre-McDonnell-Douglas-merger
production capacity, the world surplus in commercial jets and the paucity
of airline customers lining up to buy its product coalesced into a stark
and sobering crisis for behemoth Boeing: it needed a new customer for
its commercial airplanes, and a customer flush with cash at that. 7 Thus,
to bolster its sagging commercial airplane sales, it determined to
approach the United States military with its own government
procurement regime: the corporate sales pitch.'8
13. E.g., Scott Bernard Nelson, U.S. Airways Warns it May File Chapter 11,
BOSTON GLOBE, May 11, 2002, at Cl; The JOL-Fourth Year in the Limelight, ASSET
FINANCE INTERNATIONAL, May 1, 2002, at 11 (detailing the unfavorable climate for the
Japan Operating Lease in airline lease agreements, specifically after the bankruptcies of
Sabena and Swissair following the September 11, 2001, attacks).
14. George Hager and Tom Fogarty, Economy Fights Hard to Bounce Back, USA
TODAY, Oct. 25, 2001 at 3B.
15. Swissair Seeks Protection from Creditors, AIRLINE INDUSTRY INFORMATION, Oct.
2, 2001 (detailing cancellation of aircraft purchase and lease agreements); Air Europa
and Iberia End Aircraft Dispute, AIRLINE INDUSTRY INFORMATION, Mar. 22, 2002
(detailing dispute over return of rented aircraft with Iberia's decision to cut capacity by
11% in the wake of the attacks); US Airways Allowed to End More Leases, AIRLINE
INDUSTRY INFORMATION, Oct. 4, 2002 (detailing bankruptcy trustee's permission to end
over 150 aircraft and engine leasing agreements).
16. Joe Sharkey, Air Traffic Increases Despite Stored Planes, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3,
2004, at C5 (detailing the storage of some 1,610 commercial airliners in the Sonoran and
Mojave deserts, nearly a third of which were wide-bodied aircraft, in December, 2002).
17. See CBS Marketwatch, Boeing Quarterly Profits Nearly Double, (Oct. 14, 1999)
(detailing Boeing's first money-losing year-1997-in fifty after the McDonnell-
Douglas merger and its need to "streamline" its workforce and improve efficiency).
18. Robison, supra note 11. See also Wallace, supra note 11; Rick Anderson,
Boeing's War, SEATTLE WEEKLY, Oct. 11, 2001, at 11.
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B. Another Setback for Boeing: Losing the Largest Military Fighter Jet
Contract in History to Competitor Lockheed-Martin
Boeing, known primarily for its mark on the evolution of airliners, 9
was no stranger to military contracting. To the contrary, Boeing's post-
9/11 desperation for military contract money was also a direct
consequence of its failure to win the most lucrative military jet-building
contract in history-a contract it lost in a head-to-head competition with
one of its only two remaining major rivals: Lockheed-Martin. 20  The
competition began in March of 1996, with requests for proposals issued
to the prospective contractors and subsequent "concept demonstration
phase" awards issued in November of 1996.21 In November of 2001, the
final full-scale engineering and development production contract was
22awarded to Lockheed-Martin. Losing the contract left Boeing reeling,
scrambling for other defense-related work.23
C. Boeing Aggressively and Illegally Pursued a Noncompetitive
Government Contract Deal to Cross-Pollinate its Commercial
Airplane Business with Military Contracting Dollars: To Recover,
It Aimed to Retrofit and Adapt Commercial 767s for Use as Tanker
19. See PBS Home, Chasing the Sun: The Boeing 707, available at
http://www.pbs.org/kcet/chasingthesun/planes/707.html (last visited Sept. 28, 2004).
20. Boeing and Lockheed went head to head in a competition for the lucrative full-
scale engineering and development (FSED) "Joint Strike Fighter" contract, a competition
sponsored by the Department of Defense. See Tom Ramstack, Boeing Demonstrates
Airplane in Competition for Military Contract, THE WASHINGTON TIMES, July 20, 2001.
By some estimates, the value of the contract was at least $200 billion, with much more in
revenue likely to flow to the successful bidder from sales to foreign governments. Id.
The Department of Defense's goal in the competition was to develop a unitary design that
would simplify deployments and lower costs- in both the development and production
phases of the procurement process and in the operational phase after procurement -
providing design commonalities across all three service branches. See Joint Strike
Fighter Home, available at http://www.jsf.mil (last visited Sept. 28, 2004). Primarily, the
program was conceived to address the aged distress of America's military aircraft fleet-
ostensibly to replace such well-worn standouts as the Harrier, A-10 Wart Hog, F-14
Tomcat, F-16 Fighting Falcon and F/A-18 Hornet-as inexpensively as possible. See
Ramstack, supra.
21. Id.
22. See Joint Strike Fighter, Program Management and Milestones, supra note 20.
23. See Alan Bierga, War Helps and Hurts: Boeing's Case for Fuel Tankers,
WICHITA EAGLE, Apr. 16, 2003 (Boeing's loss of the Joint Strike Force contract to
Lockheed made selling the KC-767 tanker deal to Congress a "higher military priority.")
See also Rick Anderson, Boeing's War, SEATTLE WEEKLY, Oct. 11, 2001, at 11 (on
Boeing's strategy after loss of the JSF contract to press for sales of its F/A-18 Hornet (a
McDonnell-Douglas design) to both the United States military for use in the Afghanistan
theatre, and to the government of China); Sampson, supra note 1.
2004]
PENN STATE INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW
Aircraft. 24
To recover from "nosediving" commercial aircraft sales, 25 Boeing
developed a strategy to sell a large number of civil commercial aircraft to
the government as military aircraft: adapt the civil commercial 767
airframe to military use as a flying tanker.26 Boeing's popular 767, a
mid-size, two-aisle, wide-bodied commercial airplane configured in
several fuselage types (the -200ER, -300ER, and -400ER--extended
range with auxiliary fuel tanks-and freighter based on the -300ER
fuselage type), seemed particularly well suited to the requirements of the
job.27  Among its several strengths were proven reliability, ideal
range/payload capacity, fuel efficiency and Boeing's proven tanker
development and production expertise.28 Additionally, Boeing's tanker
product, the KC-135, retrofitted on the 707 airframe, is already in wide
U.S. military use.29 As such, Boeing already had an established track
24. In a report released March 29, 2004, Department of Defense Inspector General
Joseph Schmitz identified five statutory provisions that were not satisfied in the
acquisition process. Office of the Inspector General for the Department of Defense, Rpt.
No. D 2004-064, Acquisition of the Boeing KC767A Tanker Aircraft (U.S. Gov't
Printing Office, Mar, 29, 2004). First, he was critical of the appropriations legislation
itself-adopted as Pub. L. No. 107-117, 115 Stat. 2230 § 8159 (2001) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of the U.S.C.)--that authorized the leasing arrangement to
acquire the tankers, finding that it was not a "disciplined procurement strategy." Second,
he expressed concerns about the "commercial" nature of the acquisition, creating cost-
oversight opacity. Specifically, because the KC-767A is an adapted commercial-rather
than military-aircraft, Boeing was exempt from certain pricing disclosures under the
Federal Acquisition Reform Act (FARA) of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-106, 110 Stat. 678
(1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S.C.). For a discussion of
pricing information exemptions for commercial products available under FARA and the
evolution of FARA in relation to both the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994
(FASA), Pub. L. No. 103-155, 108 Stat. 1994 (1994) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of the U.S.C.), and the Truth in Negotiation Act (TINA), 10 U.S.C. § 2306, see
generally, Charles Tiefer and Ron Stroman, Congressional Intent and Commercial
Products 32 PROCUREMENT LAW. 22 (1997). Inspector General Schmitz' report,
ultimately, found that the KC-767 did not meet the statutory definition of a "commercial"
aircraft, because no real commercial market for the item "exists to establish reasonable
prices by the forces of supply and demand." Office of the Inspector General for the
Department of Defense, supra.
25. How a Hometown Jobs Plan Led to a Big Time Scandal, USA TODAY, Dec. 17,
2003, at 23A (using the term "nosedive" to describe Boeing's finances in the wake of the
events of September 11, 2001).
26. Bjerga, supra note 23.
27. See Paul Guse, 767 Tanker Transport: The Latest from the Greatest, 8 BOEING
NEWS, Mar. 8-21, 2002, available at http://www.boeing.com/commercial/767family/
pdf/767tanker.pdf (last visited Mar. 13, 2004).
28. Id.
29. See id. The KC-135 is a modified 707 airframe, a design dating from the 1950s.
The RC-135 is also a modified 707 designed for reconnaissance missions. The KC-767
program, in fact, was specifically marketed to the U.S. Air Force to address the issue of
the aging KC- 135 tanker fleet.
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record with the U.S. military, viewed as the contractor of choice for
specifically this sort of work.
1. Retrofitting Commercial Aircraft for Military Use as Tankers
Served Dual Boeing Purposes
Retrofitting civil commercial airliners to adapt them for military use
served two principal Boeing objectives: first, it propped up Boeing's
sagging commercial aircraft sales; 30 second, in the process, Boeing could
circumvent price accountability.3
As to the first of these dual objectives, Boeing's intention in
pursuing the KC-767A contract was to supplement its commercial
revenues with military contract revenues. 32  According to media
accounts, Boeing is currently dependent on military contracting for more
than half of its corporate revenues specifically because of the decline in
the production of civil transport aircraft.33 To make matters worse, from
2002 until 2003, Boeing was bleeding money from payment
delinquencies on aircraft it had already sold and financed to airline
customers.34
As to the second goal, price opacity, not only did this meet Boeing's
objectives, it also met certain political goals.35 Seen as a way to turn
powerful defense dollars into job growth and political hay, the deal also
had the imprimatur and blessing of key Congressional leadership as well
as the White House.36 The lack of clarity on the cost of building and
retrofitting the tankers most clearly served Boeing's interests, making it
30. See How a Hometown Jobs Plan Led to Big-Time Scandal, supra note 25.
31. Office of the Inspector General for the Department of Defense, supra note 24.
32. See Tony Capaccio, Pentagon: 'No Reason' to Scrap Boeing Tanker Plan,
CHICAGO SUN-TIMES, Mar. 16, 2004, at 55 (Boeing "dependent on military contracts for
more than half its revenue as commercial aircraft sales have slumped') (emphasis
added).
33. Id.
34. Briefs, 21 AIRLINE FINANCIAL NEWS, Aug. 18, 2003, at 32 (Twenty-three percent
of Boeing Capital's $1.76 billion in receivables were at least ninety days delinquent in
the first half of 2003.).
35. See Mark S. Mellman, Bush Losing Credibility, THE HILL, Mar. 17, 2004, at 23
(comparing the Bush Administration's projections on job growth to its extrapolation that
the U.S. military would find weapons of mass destruction in Iraq). See also Joseph L.
Galloway, Air Force Allowed Boeing to Rewrite Terms of Tanker Contract, Documents
Show, KNIGHT RIDDER NEWSPAPERS, available at http://www.realcities.com/mld/
krwashington/829353 1.htm (last visited Mar. 28, 2004) (detailing White House Chief of
Staff Andrew Card's direct involvement in brokering and mediating the Boeing tanker
deal, with documents and emails showing that Card's primary interest was how many
jobs it would create).
36. See Jill Zuckman, GOP's Go-To Leader on Capitol Hill: Hastert Resolves
Conflicts on Bill Such as Medicare Drug Plan, THE CHICAGO TRIBuNE, Nov. 21, 2003, at
C8 (detailing Hastert's involvement in keeping the Boeing deal alive).
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possible for Boeing to charge the government much more than it would
in a closely cost-scrutinized commercial sale.37 In addition, flaccid price
accountability standards met the politicians' interests in providing what
served as a hidden government subsidy to Boeing,38 aimed to save and
foster job growth.3 9 While creating and preserving American jobs are
laudable goals, the lack of candor about the transaction and the way in
which Boeing repositioned itself to influence congressional decision-
makers was telling.
2. Boeing Used Whatever Means Necessary to Close the Deal
To cement relationships and win the military contracting money it
needed, Boeing determined to do whatever it took, even if that meant
abandoning its strong historical and cultural relationships with the
Pacific Northwest, specifically the greater Seattle/Tacoma/Everett
metropolitan area. 40 Boeing's longstanding connection to Seattle is the
stuff of corporate legend: "Sea-Tac ' '41 and Boeing are virtually two sides
of the same aviation coin; 42 its corporate association with Seattle was as
integral to Boeing's brand as the trade name "767. "43
However, largely predicated on repositioning itself from its primary
commercial aircraft business to focus on government contracting work,
Boeing announced in 2001 that it was relocating its corporate
headquarters. The Seattle business community was stunned.4 4 Boeing
37. Office of the Inspector General for the Department of Defense, supra note 24.
38. See Alex Taylor 111, Lord of the Air: What's Left for Airbus after Overtaking
Boeing in the Commercial Aircraft Market?, FORTUNE, Nov. 10, 2003, at 144 (comparing
Boeing's "steady supply of treats from Washington such as a controversial $21 billion air
tanker deal" to Airbus's direct government subsidies from EU member countries); see
also Robert J. Samuelson, The Bad News from Boeing, NEWSWEEK, June 30, 2003, at 38
(comparing the 767 tanker deal to a "disguised [corporate] rescue.")
39. Galloway, supra note 35.
40. William E. Boeing founded the Boeing company in the Seattle/Puget Sound area
in 1916. Originally incorporated as the Pacific Aero Products Company, the
corporation's very identity reflected its commitment to the Pacific Northwest. Boeing
Company History, available at http://www.boeing.com/history/boeing/ (last visited Sept.
28, 2004).
41. Aviation parlance for the Seattle-Tacoma Airport.
42. See Todd Bishop, Boeing Through and Through: Condit's Career Begins and
Ends With Company, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Dec. 2, 2003, at A8 (considering the
corporation's move to Chicago and Condit's retirement as the "last nail in the coffin of
the company's connection to Seattle.")
43. See, e.g., Boeing, Commercial Airplanes Gallery, available at
http://www.boeing.com/companyoffices/galery/images/commercialU767400-02.html (last
visited Mar. 31, 2004); Steven Dunphy, 140,000 Puget Sound-Area Workers Depend on
Boeing for their Jobs Directly or Indirectly. What happens if Boeing Decides to Build its
Airplanes Somewhere Else?, SEATTLE TIMES (Oct. 26, 2003) (commenting that,
historically, Boeing and Seattle have been "joined at the hip").
44. Bishop, supra note 42
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downplayed the move, pledging to keep the bulk of its commercial
aircraft operation in Seattle.45
Despite its promises to Washington state and Seattle civic leaders,
Boeing moved to exploit and strengthen politically significant
relationships. More specifically, Boeing understood that it would need to
both influence the Congressional leadership and, more important, secure
White House backing for any appropriations legislation in order to
ensure the deal was foolproof.
46
a. It Relocated its Corporate Headquarters to Chicago to Garner
Political Influence
Thus, roughly concurrent with Boeing's decision to "float" the
tanker deal concept to Congress as a much smaller package-in the
spring of 2001-it announced it was considering relocating its corporate
headquarters to Dallas, Denver, or Chicago.47 The fact that the Speaker
of the House, Dennis Hastert, and Representatives Blagojevich, Evans,
and Kirk-all of Illinois and all on the House of Representatives Armed
Services Committee 48-- had direct links not only to Chicago but also to
the military contracts selection process, was not lost on many.49 Boeing
45. Boeing Company History, supra note 40. Some, however, have suggested that
Boeing intends to withdraw from the commercial airplane business altogether to focus on
military contracting, like competitor Lockheed-Martin. DAviD PRITCHARD & ALAN
MACPHERSON, THE TRADE AND EMPLOYMENT IMPLICATIONS OF A NEW AIRCRAFT
LAUNCH: THE CASE OF THE BOEING 7E7 (Canada-United States Trade Center, State
University of New York, Buffalo, New York 2003), available at
http://www.geog.buffalo.edu/custac/7e7%20University%20at%2OBuffalo.pdf (last
visited Mar. 28, 2004).
46. Stephen J. Hedges, Hardball Tactics Backfire on Boeing: Military Tanker Deal
Brings Probes, CI. TRiB., Jan. 26, 2004, at 1, available at 2004 WL 65046314.
According to the Chicago Tribune, Boeing-in a display of political bravado-went over
OMB Director Mitch Daniel's head because he expressed misgivings that the tanker deal
violated government accounting standards. Boeing went straight to the White House and
arranged a series of meetings with key White House and Congressional leadership-
including the President, Chief of Staff to the President Andrew Card, and Speaker of the
House Dennis Hastert (a resident of the Chicago suburbs)--to push the deal through by
May, 2003. Id.
47. Susan Chandler, Deal Trims Boeing's Payoff, Clout, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 7, 2003, at
Cl (detailing inception of the tanker proposal and the financing proposal to pay for the
leases by "floating" a bond issue); John Schmeltzer, Hewing to New Course, CHI. TRIB.,
Sept. 2, 2001 (detailing the date and time of the move to Chicago, Condit's plans for
expansion of Boeing's core businesses, and the "bright spot" represented by military
contracting).
48. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003: Hearing on H.R. and
Oversight of Previously Authorized Programs Before the Comm. On Armed Services
H.R., 107th Cong. 33 (2002) (statement of James G. Roche, Secretary, United States Air
Force) (at which the Illinois contingent is in full attendance).
49. Katherine Pfleger, Illinois Friend in High Places Helped Pilot Boeing-Air Force
Deal, THE SEATTLE TIMES, Nov. 13, 2003, at Al.
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eventually announced its intention to move to Chicago to position itself
closer to "global financial markets" with "easy access to major Boeing
operations and customers.,
50
b. Boeing Circumvented Procurement Law by Structuring the
Tanker Deal as a Leasing Arrangement that Did Not Meet the Executive
Branch's Own Budgetary Guidelines.
To further obfuscate the inflated, final cost of the 767-tanker
contract deal to the American taxpayer, Boeing structured it as a lease to
achieve an "end run" around the standard Congressional budget and
procurement process. 5 In the Inspector General's own language:
[T]he Air Force used Section 8159 of the Department of Defense
Appropriations Act for FY 2002 to justify its informal acquisition
strategy, the focus and goal of which was to expeditiously lease 100
Boeing 767A tanker aircraft without regard to best business
practices, prudent acquisition procedures, and compliance with
statutory requirements for testing.
52
Specifically, the lease did not meet three of the six specific requirements
established by the Office of Management and Budget for capital
operating leases.53 More troubling still, during the investigation of the
50. Id. The major customer Boeing sought to woo-the United States military-by
"repositioning" its corporate headquarters within Hastert's particular sphere of
influence-greater Chicago-also did not go unnoticed.
51. 149 CONG. REc. S. 14261-62 (floor speech of Senator John McCain addressing
the topic of "Congressional pork," in which he expresses concern that the lease proposal,
as originally conceived and presented to the Air Force-specifically to avoid the
procedural check of the standard Pentagon budget process, the Secretary of Defense, and
OMB-would "defer the payment burden to someone else at some unspecified point in
the future").
52. Office of the Inspector General for the Department of Defense, supra note 24
(emphasis added). With respect to the lease agreement itself, the IG determined that the
proposed lease agreement did not conform to the requirements of OMB Circular No. A-
11. See Executive Office of the President of the United States, Office of Management
and Budget, Circular No. A-1 1, Preparation, Submission and Execution of the Budget,
(Appendix B-Scoring Lease-Purchases and Leases of Capital Assets) (July 2003) at
633. The specific testing requirement mandated by 10 U.S.C. § 2366 (2003) and 10
U.S.C. § 2399 (2003) to ensure the tanker fleet was "operationally effective, suitable and
survivable" prior to the commencement of large-scale production, was also cited as a
specific omission.
53. Those requirements are: 1) ownership of the asset remains with the lessor during
the term of the lease and is not transferred to the Government at or shortly after the end of
the lease term; 2) the lease does not contain a bargain-price purchase option; 3) the lease
term does not exceed 75 percent of the estimated economic life of the asset; 4) the present
value of the minimum lease payments over the life of the lease does not exceed 90
percent of the fair market value of the asset at the beginning of the lease term; 5) the asset
is a general purpose asset rather than being for a special purpose of the Government and
is not built to the unique specification of the Government as lessee; 6) there is a private
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tanker procurement process that was eventually ordered by Secretary of
Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld on December 17, 2003, conflicts of interest
between Boeing officials and former Deputy Air Force Assistant
Secretary for Acquisition and Management, Darlene Druyun, then a
Boeing Vice-President, were brought to light.
3. A Scandal Erupted, Ending the Tenure of CFO John Sears,
CEO Phil Condit, and Subjecting Former Pentagon Staffer and Boeing
Executive Darlene Druyun to Criminal Prosecution for Conspiracy to
Defraud the United States
Specifically, Ms. Druyun was accused and eventually convicted of
conspiring to defraud the United States by using her daughter, Heather
McKee, to conduct pre-employment discussions with Boeing Chief
Financial Officer Michael Sears while she was administering the
proposed tanker contract.54 Eventually, Ms. Druyun recused herself from
all Boeing contract procurement decision-making just 10 days prior to
her mid-November 2002 retirement.55 However, her recusal did not
precede the investigation that revealed she had already largely
orchestrated much of the 767 tanker lease program while Boeing was
actively recruiting her to assume an influential position as a Vice
President of its Missile Defense Systems division. 56 Boeing fired her and
CFO Michael Sears in November 2003, citing ethics violations. 7 She
eventually pled guilty to the conspiracy charge.58
sector market for the asset. Executive Office of the President, OMB Circular No. A-Il
supra note 52, at 638.
54. See Susan Chandler, Boeing Fires Pair in Ethics Investigation, CHI. TRIB., Nov.




58. United States v. Druyun, No. 04-CR-150-ALL (E.D. Va., filed Apr. 6, 2004)
(plea agreement to charges brought under 18 U.S.C. § 371, entered April 20, 2004, with
sentencing scheduled for August 6, 2004); Merle and Markon, supra note 2 (detailing
imposition of sentence on October 1, 2004, with the Honorable T.S. Ellis, III imposing
nine months of incarceration in a federal Bureau of Prisons facility). See also Office of
Inspector General for the Department of Defense, supra note 24. There were also
allegations in media reports that Druyun had violated the Procurement Integrity Act, 41
U.S.C. § 423 (2004) by divulging valuable source selection information or competing
contractor bid information, specifically competing price information submitted by
Airbus' military contracting arm, EADS (European Aeronautic Defence and Space
Company) and competing information from Lockheed-Martin on a pending rocket
contract. She eventually admitted this at her sentencing allocution. Merle, supra note 2.
Cynthia Wilson, Pentagon Investigates Fired Boeing Worker, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH,
Nov. 26, 2003, at Al. Later, these suspicions were confirmed, with EADS, Lockheed
and BAE threatening to sue. Renae Merle, Boeing Competitors Protest, THE
WASHINGTON POST, (October 13, 2004) at E 03.
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Once the scandal broke, Senator John McCain became a particularly
vociferous critic of the tanker contract proposal considering it largely a
"bailout" for Boeing.5 9 Further movement on the 767 proposal came to a
screeching halt.6°
II. A Study in Contrasts: The Former Regime in U.S. Production and
Procurement of Military Aircraft
The Boeing 767 tanker scandal underscores the basic premise of
Anthony Sampson's definitive 1970s expose of the military arms trade:
it is susceptible to "desperate" competition that often depends entirely
upon politically corrupt processes rather than a rational scheme for
support.6 I In the face of such obviously corrupt processes and Boeing's
protestations of corporate innocence despite incontrovertible evidence to
the contrary,62 the continued political will of major congressional
sponsors and the Air Force to get the Boeing tanker deal funded seems
all the more remarkable.63
The Boeing tanker procurement regime-a throwback to the past-
is not so much an organized regimen as an orchestrated and politicized
study in crisis management, revolving primarily around contractor sales
needs, veneered with the laudable, if somewhat implausible, political
goals of economic growth and full employment. Stated in the
alternative, when procurement is primarily driven by political and
corporate interests, the process devolves.64 Given the complexity and
59. 148 Cong. Rec. S.7710 (July 31, 2002).
60. John Tirpak, Tanker Twilight Zone, 48 Air Force Magazine (Feb. 2004); Merle
and Markon, supra note 2.
61. Sampson, supra note 1.
62. Merle and Markon, supra note 2 (detailing a pending guilty plea by Boeing CFO
John Sears).
63. Office of the Inspector General for the Department of Defense, supra note 24.
Inspector General Schmitz concluded, for instance, that the Operational Requirements
Document (ORD) had been "tailored"-not to operational requirements for
"interoperability" as required-but to Boeing's requirements. Media reports have
suggested that at the June 7, 2002, meeting of the Pentagon's Joint Requirements
Oversight Council, at which the ORD was reviewed, a direct question about whether the
tanker proposal had been "tailored" to Boeing's requirements was answered in the
negative. That answer was allegedly a lie, giving rise to other allegations of impropriety
within the Air Force. Joseph Galloway & Alan Bjerga, Pentagon Report Indicates
Boeing Investigations Have Widened, KNIGHT RIDDER NEWS SERVICE, Mar. 31, 2004.
The Joint Oversight Requirements Council, moreover, is a relatively recent statutory
development, implemented with passage of the National Defense Authorization Act for
FY 1996, Pub. L. 104-106, 110 Stat. 104, codified at 10 U.S.C. § 181 (2003). As the
Boeing tanker contract process has thus far demonstrated, contractor "insiders" have little
difficulty circumventing the statutory requirement. More specifically, Dru]7un explicitly
acknowledged inflating pricing on the tanker proposal as a parting "gift" to her new
employer Boeing, during her sentencing allocution. Merle and Markon, supra note 2.
64. Id. The current process involving the bidding for the 767-tanker contract,
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cost associated with developing tactical and commercial aircraft for the
specialized uses of the military, advocates as persuasive as Senator John
McCain have argued that the United States no longer has the fiscal
luxury to artificially support an uncompetitive contractor with "political
pork., 65  More pointedly, many in the aviation business community
suggest that Boeing's appetite for acquiring rivals and its short-term
bottom line orientation led to its own eventual undoing. This, in turn, led
to the need to orchestrate the 767-tanker deal, even further delegitimizing
the fat government lease payments Boeing may yet win.6 6
A. Purpose-Specific Fleet Planning-Aircraft-Specific Fleet
Procurement
The impulse to protect American industry and jobs is a natural-
even admirable-political aspiration. But the current aviation
procurement regime at work in such schemes as the Boeing 767 tanker
deal did not start with job growth or creation as its impetus; the starting
point, instead, has been the promotion of a product-specific corporate
goal, couched in the corporate sales pitch and insider influence.67
however, is hardly anything new. Similar charges were lodged against military aviation
contractors in the Reagan administration-for instance-with the award of a transport
contract to McDonnell Douglas to produce C-17 aircraft. The Administration, which
wanted Lockheed-a California-based company-to get the contract for its C-5B,
essentially ignored the Air Force's original recommendation that McDonnell-Douglas-
based in St. Louis-get the Pentagon's nod. Congress overrode the Executive, however,
with powerful Senator Henry Jackson of Washington leading the charge to retrofit and
adapt Seattle-based Boeing's 747 airframe. Eventually, Lockheed's conflict-of-interest
laden lobbying of Air Force personnel and an ensuing public scandal sabotaged its own
promotion efforts, and McDonnell-Douglas' C-17 assembly line was saved. See
American Defence Contracts: Transports of Hate, THE ECONOMIST, July 10, 1982, at 63.
See also, Glenn R. Pascall, Boeing's Real Issues Are Just Beneath the Surface, SEATTLE
BUSINESS JOURNAL, Dec. 5, 2003 (calling the award of the C-17 contract to Douglas
"pure politics" when the 747 adaptation was clearly the superior design).
65. The question of how appropriations and spending decisions are made and how
the current system for appropriating funds evolved is, of course, an enormously complex
consideration unto itself, completely beyond the scope of this limited discussion. See
Tiefer, supra note 4, at 124-131 (for a concise outline and description of the
appropriations and funding processes). See generally GOVERNMENT CONTRACT LAW:
THE DESKBOOK FOR PROCUREMENT PROFESSIONALS (American Bar Association, Section
on Public Contract Law 1999).
66. Pascall, supra note 69 (arguing that Boeing is a company "scrambling to find its
way" since the McDonnell Douglas merger with no "strategic foresight").
67. The Druyun prosecution has produced fresh allegations of wrong doing in
Boeing's intense sales efforts. Specifically, allegations about similar kinds of inside
dealing between Druyun and Boeing's Integrated Defense System head, James Albaugh,
recently surfaced and the Justice Department has subsequently launched an investigation
into the cozy relationship between Boeing and the Department of the Air Force. See
David Bowermaster, Defense Tags Boeing A WACS Deal for Criticism, THE SEATTLE
TIMES, Apr. 16, 2004, at C1.
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Much of the former U.S. military tactical aircraft fleet, therefore, is
not the product of serious integrated fleet planning. 68  Integrated fleet
planning-from the military perspective-is a fairly novel concept
derived largely from the civil context, the application of which the
military branches have largely borrowed from the airlines. 69 Faced with
the cutthroat economic environment of low fares, razor thin margins, and
relatively fixed labor costs, successful airline carriers have understood
the cost-benefits of common fleet design, which includes limiting the
kinds of aircraft they fly in order to regulate costs for maintenance,
training, deployment, and software development.7 °
This is not to say, of course, that the U.S. military's air fleet has not
been the product of extensive, even exhaustive, planning.71 Nor is it
intended to minimize the functional variations required in a military fleet
that are not present in the civil context.72 Often, however, military fleet
needs and planning have conflicted with corporate and political interests
as well as the more parochial goals of the specific service branches.73
Furthermore, because of the technological sophistication required of
military fleets, cost considerations have also taken a back seat to the
inherent inefficiencies of developing heretofore-unknown technologies.
74
68. Nowhere is this more apparent than in the wide disparities in maintenance
required as America's aging military air fleet crumbles. See Getting Worse with Age, AIR
FORCE TIMES (Aug. 2, 2004) (discussing the need for integrated fleet modernization, the
cost implications of upgrading the fleet, and the problems with maintaining an aging,
disintegrated fleet as the age of an average Air Force fighter aircraft approaches nineteen
years and the average bomber twenty-two years).
69. Lockheed's Joint Strike Fighter is a major exception to this rule, and a major
"rethink" for U.S. military aircraft fleet planning and deployment. CHRISTOPHER
BOLCKOM, JOINT STRIKE FIGHTER PROGRAM (Congressional Research Service, Library of
Congress, 2003).
70. Some of the more successful niche carriers, like Southwest and JetBlue, fly only
a single kind of airplane, the Boeing 737 or Airbus A-320, specifically to be most cost-
efficient. This has helped make Southwest and JetBlue much more competitive in
markets against old-school carriers operating upwards of eight aircraft types like
USAirways, who during the late 1990s were struggling to modernize fleets to diminish
costs along common aircraft types. This efficiency has, in certain markets like Baltimore,
enabled Southwest-for instance-to essentially drive USAirways out where it was once
the dominant carrier. See JetBlue 101, available at http://www.jetblue.com/
learnmore/airl0l.html (last visited Sept. 28, 2004). See also Southwest Airlines, Fleet,
available at http://www.southwest.com/about-swa/press/factsheet.html#Fleet (last visited
Sept. 28, 2004).
71. See Boickom, supra note 69.
72. Id. Most military fleets include tactical fighter aircraft, which are used to
destroy enemy command and control as well as prepare the way for munitions delivery
by bomber aircraft. The United States currently has eight fighter aircraft in its current
fleet, including the A-10, F-14, F-15, F-16, F-18, F-22, the AV-8 Harrier, and the F-1 17.
73. Both the current Boeing 767 tanker scandal and the Lockheed/McDonnell-
Douglas C-17 scandal strike the author as archetypal examples.
74. See Bolckom, supra note 69, at 17. See also, LANE PIERROT AND JOANN VINES,
[Vol. 23:2
THE BOEING 767 TANKER BOONDOGGLE
B. Stealth-The Beginnings of an Integrated, Infrastructural Approach
to Fleet Planning but Not Procurement
Nowhere has the tension between cost control and the commitment
to duplicating or improving an already-realized technology been more
apparent than in the story of Northrop's research and development of the
"stealthy" B-2 Bomber and McDonnell-Douglas's unsuccessful attempt
to develop the carrier-based A-12 during the early 1990s. 75 Faced with
the prospect of having to devise a design that was "invisible" to enemy
radar, Northrop experimented with several possible designs and finally
settled on the now-familiar "flying wing" profile of the B-2 in an effort
to reduce its radar signature and overall visibility.76 Along the way,
Northrop did not have the benefit of Lockheed's expertise in managing
both the complexity of the program and design process; Lockheed's
expertise, for instance, brought the initial development and design of the
original "stealthy" F-117 Nighthawk Fighter in on time and under
budget."
Unsurprisingly, the cost overruns in developing both the B-2 and
the Navy's "stealthy" A-12 were the stuff of corporate and government
scandals in the early 1990s. Accusations that Northrop, General
Dynamics, and McDonnell-Douglas had intentionally distorted cost
overruns and that Navy managers-in the case of the A-12-had lied
about the costs of the respective programs to the Pentagon ran rampant.78
These scandals emerged despite the fact that all of the aircraft in
development under these respective programs were ostensibly conceived
along the same tactical design premise: the implementation of "stealth"
technology in land and aircraft carrier-based fighter aircraft, as well as
strategic bomber aircraft, was proposed to inhibit advance discovery by
enemy radar systems, increase the effectiveness of munitions delivery,
and reduce U.S. losses.79  The emergence of "stealth" technology
A LOOK AT TOMORROw'S TACTICAL AIR FORCES (Report of the Cong. Budget Office,
1997).
75. See Rick Atkinson, Stealth: From 18-inch Model to $70 Billion Muddle, THE
WASH. POST, Oct. 8, 1989, at Al. Lockheed, in fact, openly mocked Northrop's radical
"flying wing" design and derided its fiscal mismanagement of the project at the time,
arguing that because it had already developed the F-1 17 and brought the project in under
budget, it should have been awarded the B-2 contract as well.
76. See Northrup-Grumman Home, B2 Spirit Page, available at
http://www.is.northropgrumman.com/products/usafiproducts/b2/b2.html (last visited
Sept. 29, 2004).
77. See AF Will Keep Enough F-117 Tooling for Spare Parts, Repairs, AEROSPACE
DAILY, May 17, 1990, at 282 (detailing program's ahead-of-schedule and under-budget
status).
78. This One Will Overrun, and Run, and-FLIGHT INTERNATIONAL Dec. 12, 1990.
79. David A. Fulghum, Stealth Retains Value, but its Monopoly Wanes, AVIATION
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embodied in the F- 117 was arguably the starting point for modem U.S.
military aircraft fleet because it forced the implementation of a common
concept across the divided lines of the various service branches.80
Starting from this unitary concept, as a managerial scheme, it is
difficult to fathom why the government would subsequently parcel the
research and development work out to four or five different contractors,
each bringing his or her set of distinctive "trademark" designs to the
process.8' Given Lockheed's "stealth" design expertise after the F-I 17,
with its sophisticated development of graphite and carbon-based
composites in particular, it was the natural choice for the B-2 contract.
82
As a procurement regime, however, parceling the research and
development work out to several different contractors for a project where
an existing contractor had already realized much of the developmental
technology was even more baffling.83  Such a regime was certain to
increase the cost of procurement because by having to "start from
scratch," research and development commonalities between projects
were effectively eliminated.84
In the case of the A- 12 program, the disastrous financial fallout was
predictable because neither McDonnell-Douglas, beneficiary of the
program to the tune of nearly $2 billion, nor General Dynamics, its
design partner, had any particular design experience in the extensive
adaptation of composites, which was required to lighten the A-12 to
suitable aircraft-carrier takeoff/landing operating weight.8 ' Nearly a
third heavier than required, McDonnell-Douglas eventually failed to
deliver even a single A-12 aircraft.86
The government, led by then Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney
and Rear Adm. William Morris, issued a cure notice on December 17,
1990.87 McDonnell-Douglas and General Dynamics, in response,
requested the contract be restructured.88 The government declined,
WK. & SPACE TECH, Feb. 5, 2001, at 53.
80. It took Congress nearly ten years to figure this out, however, and required "joint
interoperability" between the various service branches after the establishment of the
JROC. See 10 U.S.C. § 118.
81. For the defining example, see McDonnell-Douglas v. United States, 323 F. 3d
1006, 1011 (Fed. Cir. 2003).





87. A "cure notice" is typically a letter, advising the contractor of conditions that
might eventually result in termination. In the case of the A- 12 program, however, the
cure notice included notice of actual intention to terminate, leaving the result much less
hypothetical. Atkinson, supra note 75.
88. Id.
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terminating the contract for default and demanding repayment of the
liquidated progress payments. 89 Litigation ensued in the Federal Court of
Claims that, nearly thirteen years later, has not yet concluded, with
McDonnell and General Dynamics arguing that the termination for
default be equitably adjusted to termination for convenience. 90 The
McDonnell/General Dynamics A-12 case, indeed, seems to be the poster-
child for infrastructurally-conceived aircraft fleet planning, design,
production, and procurement programs that are designed to support,
rather than frustrate, the common benefits of hard-earned technological
breakthroughs the taxpayer has already bought.9' With the Joint Strike
Fighter program, the government appeared to learn that limited lesson,
though its larger benefits still appear to take a "back seat" to corporate
sales needs.92
III. A New Infrastructurally-Conceived Regime: Aircraft as Cogs in
the Air Defense Wheel-The Boeing/Lockheed JSF and EADS
MRTT/Boeing KC-767 Contract Competitions in the United States
and the United Kingdom
A. The Joint Strike Fighter Program
Largely in response to the A-12 debacle, development and
procurement of the next generation of fighter aircraft took a completely
different turn. 9 3 According to the Congressional Research Service, the
government did a "bottom-up-review" of the cost of tactical aviation
procurement in 1993, concluding that it needed to "reduce acquisition
and operating costs. ' 94  In response it approved the new Joint-Strike
Fighter program, novel in very concept; rather than contract a product-
specific research and development plan for a service-and-use-specific
89. McDonnell-Douglas v. United States, 25 CI. Ct. 342 (1992), later proceeding, 27
Fed. CI. 204 (1992), later proceeding, 29 Fed, Cl. 791 (1993), adopted by, 35 Fed. Cl.
358 (1996), later proceeding, 37 Fed. Cl. 270 (1996), motion denied in part, 37 Fed. Cl.
285 (1997), summary judgment denied, 37 Fed. Cl. 295 (1997), motion denied, 1997 U.S.
Claims LEXIS 319 (June 13, 1997), partial summary judgment denied, 1997 U.S. Claims
LEXIS 318 (Aug. 21, 1997), modified, 39 Fed. Cl. 665 (1997),judgment entered, appeal
dismissed, 152 F.3d 944 (Fed. Cir 1998), vacated, 40 Fed. Cl. 429 (1998), vacated, 182
F.3d 1319 (Fed. Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1097 (2000), remanded, 50 Fed. Cl.
311 (2001), affd in part, vacated in part, remanded, 323 F. 3d 1006 (Fed. Cir. 2003),
reh 'g, reh 'g en banc denied (Aug. 27, 2003) (listing of the case's extensive procedural
history and posture to demonstrate the duration and complexity of the litigation, with
some related matters omitted).
90. Id.; see Tiefer, supra note 4, at 473.
91. Id.
92. Merle and Markon, supra note 2.
93. Bolckom, supra note 69.
94. Id.
2004]
PENN STATE INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW
aircraft, the Department of Defense approached Boeing and Lockheed to
start with a unitary design that was capable of being adapted to use-
specific variants (i.e., conventional take off and landing (CTOL) in an
Air Force variant, carrier-capable (CV) in a Navy version, and short take
off and vertical-landing (STOVL) maneuver-capable in its Marine Corps
95adaptation). The concept of one airplane adapted to all three service
branches was radical at the time in military circles.9 6 In airline circles,
however, the basic concept was already a twenty-year-old established
orthodoxy.97
Though the uses of military aircraft do not entirely analogize to
those of civil aircraft, both military and commercial aircraft fleets
share-at a minimum-this: the cost of developing, maintaining, training
for, and operating use-specific heterogeneous fleets far exceeds their
benefit, especially when a unitary design concept can be adapted for
multiple uses.98 Airbus Industrie's rise to dominance over Boeing in the
global commercial/civil aircraft manufacturing sector commonality is
largely predicated on its adoption of this design philosophy.99 Airbus
boasts that since perfecting its "fly-by-wire" technology'00 in the early
1980s, its cabin and cockpit designs share remarkable "uniformity and
trim characteristics,"' 0' such that flying one Airbus airliner is "virtually
identical" to flying any other.
10 2
95. Bolckom, supra note 69.
96. Id.
97. Herb Kelleher founded southwest Airlines in 1971 with three Boeing 737s flying
short routes from Dallas' Love Field. The airline committed early on to operating only
one kind of aircraft. Stanley Holmes, Boeing Asks Airlines for Advice on New 737s, and
Old Customers Help Out, SEATrLE TIMES Nov. 17, 1997, at 1E. Today, Southwest is a
model of efficiency and profitability in the industry, because its operating costs are so
low. See Tom Belden, Southwest Airlines Airs Plan for Rapid Expansion in
Philadelphia, THE PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, Mar. 26, 2004, at C 1.
98. Bolckom, supra note 69.
99. See Airbus Industrie, Media Library, available at http://www.airbus.com/media/
commonality.asp (last visited Sept. 28, 2004).
100. Id. "Fly by wire" technology, a reference to an electronic flight deck that
employs on board computers to effect the mechanical maneuvering of aircraft parts-as
opposed to the more standard mechanical linkages on Boeing and Douglas aircraft
available at the time of its inception-however, is not without its controversies. Boeing
has subsequently adopted fly-by-wire technology on its 777, but includes fail-safe
devices to permit the crew to take control of the aircraft away from the computer
should-for any reason-it fail.
101. When an aircraft is flying in equilibrium, it is -in trim. Trim characteristics
typically refer to the ease or difficulty of balancing the countervailing forces of lift and
downforce to keep the aircraft in level flight. When trim stabilizers malfunction, the
defect is frequently catastrophic. See Chuck Taylor, Flight 261: Looking for Answers,
SEATrLE TIMES, Feb. 2, 2000, at Al (detailing the crash of Alaska Airlines' Flight 261
near Oxnard, California implicating a defective rear tail trim stabilizer in the crash of the
MD-80).
102. Bolckom, supra note 69; see also, Ramstack, supra note 6.
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In the JSF project, the United States military began to understand
for the first time what the civil aviation sector had known since at least
the 1980s; the development of individual aircraft types had to be
conceived in relation to the total fleet's air defense infrastructure, rather
than as isolated pieces of high tech weaponry designed solely for a
specific use or task. 10 3 More important, such a development philosophy
was directly linked to procurement and operations, because cost savings
was the principal policy goal.1 4
With this in mind, the Joint Strike Fighter procurement regime was
structured completely differently to produce a "common family" of
aircraft: first, there was direct government subsidy for the development
phase, given to two-rather than one-potential contractors, Boeing and
Lockheed, structured as Concept Demonstration Phase prime contracts;
that paved the way for a direct competition phase between them, with
one selected to finally enter the engineering and manufacturing
development (EMD) phase.1
05
1. Direct Government Subsidy for Research and Development
To put both contractors on equal footing, the government directly
subsidized a competition, making it illegal for Boeing and Lockheed to
spend their own monies on initial development. 10 6 To this end, Congress
appropriated approximately $1.5 billion, split equally between the two
aerospace giants.' 0 7 In the latter phase of the competition, the cap on
spending became something of an issue because both Boeing and
Lockheed had significant cost overruns directly related to the cost of
developing the "short take-off, vertical landing" (STOVL) technology.0 8
Boeing abandoned its original design in favor of a redesign in view of
projected production costs, and Lockheed had development problems
implementing a complex, mechanical vertical lift-fan design in the
STOVL variant for the Marine Corps.'0 9 In response, the government
modified the contract, relaxing the rigid requirement that restricted the
contractors from spending their own development dollars."0  Instead,
103. Bolckom, supra note 69.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. See Pub. L. No. 104-201, 110 Stat. 2422 (1996); Pub. L. No. 105-85, 111 Stat.
1629 (1997); Pub. L. No. 106-398, 114 Stat. 1654 (2000) (all codified as amended in
scattered sections of the U.S.C.) (authorizing Joint Strike Fighter appropriations during
the Concept Demonstration Phase).
107. Id.
108. E.g., David A. Fulghum, Lockheed-Martin Faces JSF Cost Overruns, 150
AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH. 6, Feb. 8, 1999, at 27.
109. Id.
110. Industry to Spend Their Own Money to Keep JSF Teams Together, ARMED
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their own respective internal expenditures were capped at $60-100
million each."'
Direct congressional funding of the "concept demonstration" phase
had been controversial, particularly when news broke of the cost
overruns.11 2 Critics charged that corporations like Boeing and Lockheed
were reaping the benefit of government-bought technologies, using those
development dollars to apply the emerging technologies to their own
commercial products. 113 Boeing, which has complained for years of the
direct governmental subsidies afforded its principal competitor, Airbus
Industrie, suddenly developed a new-found corporate tolerance for the
idea of direct government assistance."l
4
In the case of the JSF program, such aid was a conspicuous part of
the contract package and appropriations legislation. 115  Even with
political infighting over the goals and costs of the program, there was
complete candor about funding the R & D phase because cost
containment was an integrated program goal. Spending money in the
short-term to save it in the long-term made sense. 16 This approach,
incidentally, largely mirrored that of the nations of the European
Community for funding aerospace development. Specifically, direct
government subsidy of aerospace development in the hands of private
contractors was in the government's interest, because it ensured both
technologic and economic soundness of the military-industrial base as
well as international competitiveness.'17
FORCES NEWSWIRE SERVICE, Apr. 14, 2000 (describing JSF Program Office's intention to
"incorporate[e] new contractual language" permitting internal expenditures).
111. Id.
112. Bolckom, supra note 69.
113. Specifically, Boeing's incorporation of innovative composite technology in the
7E7 adapts many of the lessons it learned in developing the same materials for the JSF.
See William Cole, The Value of Lessons Learned, 2 BOEING FRONTIERS 8 (Dec. 2003-
Jan. 2004), Internal Boeing e-newsletter available at http://www.boeing.com/news/
frontiers/archive/ 2003/december/ts.sf5.html (last visited Sept. 28, 2004).
114. Airbus Industrie, moreover, has recently "turned the tables" on Boeing's
"corporate grumbling" about direct government subsidies, arguing that Japanese support
for the new 7E7 airliner launch, as well as State of Washington tax incentives, are
forbidden under both General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, EC-US AGREEMENT ON
TRADE IN LARGE CIVIL AIRCRAFT, July 17, 1992, Arts. 3, 4 & 5, 1993 B.D.I.E.L. A.D.
LEXIS 60 (1993), and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Final Act
Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Apr.
15, 1994, AGREEMENT ON SUBSIDIES AND COUNTERVAILING MEASURES, 1994 B.D.I.E.L.
A.D. LEXIS 58, which limit both direct and indirect governmental support for large civil
aircraft development. James Wallace, About Those Subsidies for 7E7, SEATTLE POST-
INTELLIGENCER, (March 31, 2004), at D1. See PRITCHARD & MACPHERSON, supra note
45.
115. Id. See also supra note 106.
116. Id.
117. Alternatively, when the French, German and British governments announced
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2. The Multiple Rewards of Direct Competition
After funding for the "concept demonstration" phase was approved,
Boeing and Lockheed competed directly with one another to produce
their respective vision of the "base" unitary design, with the competition
organized along subsequent development of the three specific variant
capabilities required for the particular service branches. 1 8  Boeing's
vision was the X-32." 9 Lockheed's was the X-35. 20
While the particulars of the competition are beyond the scope of this
discussion, the benefits of the competition for the government were
obvious: development costs were controlled, technological
breakthroughs were achieved, and a common design framework and
unitary base for the United States' tactical air fleet was realized.1
21
Eventually, Lockheed-Martin-which took a huge gamble during the
competition phase by opting for a risky, radical mechanical lift-fan
design in the Marine (STOVL) variant-won the production-phase
contract.1 22 In the process, however, it arguably produced a more stable
vertical lift/landing technology than was previously available in the
British Harrier "jump jet."'
' 23
B. The EADS Tanker Program-Multi-Use Variants and Directly
Competitive Procurement Process in The United Kingdom
1. EADS's MRTT Tanker-Multiple Roles for Tanker Aircraft
in Variations on a Unitary Tanker Design Theme
The EADS tanker program, Multi-Role Tanker Transport (MRTT),
also stressed multiple-use variants like the Joint Strike Fighter program,
something that quintessentially distinguished its Airbus-airliner
interest-free loans to Airbus for the development of the "Super Jumbo" A380--a civil
aircraft analogizing to procurement of the 767 under FARA's commercial exemption-
the notion of government subsidies for civil aerospace development was completely
intolerable to the United States' government. Airbus Jumbo in US. Sights THE
AUSTRALIAN, Jan. 12, 2001, at 24 (quoting an unnamed U.S. "trade official" commenting
that, "Airbus is a grown-up company that has 50 per cent of the market and is doing fine
and there is no reason why the government needs to subsidise it.").





123. For this reason, the Royal Navy has elected to acquire the X-35, rechristened the
F-35 after Lockheed won the concept demonstration phase of the contract competition, to
replace the Harrier. See Royal Navy, Future Aircraft, available at http://www.royal-
navy.mod.uk/static/pages/2002.html (last visited Apr. 2, 2004).
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adaptations from Boeing's retrofitted 767 transport version. 124  EADS
built inherent flexibility into its airliner tanker adaptations, which could
dispense on-board fuel from pods located at each wing to two fighter jet
aircraft simultaneously. 125  The A-310 MRTT, with containerized
auxiliary refueling tanks confined to the cargo hold, is available in
multiple variants. 126 In one configuration, the aircraft can function as a
flying hospital to accommodate up to six intensive-care status and fifty-
six stretcher-case status wounded. 127 In another variant, like the Boeing
KC-767, the MRTT can also be configured to carry troops and freight, in
addition to acting as an aerial refueling station. 28  Additionally, the
MRTT is available either in the A310 or the A330 fuselage variant for
range and payload flexibility.
129
Not conceived merely as an airborne gas station converted from an
airliner airframe, the MRTT's multi-role transport adaptations are
integrated instead into its refueling function and integrated with its
varying payload and range capabilities to meet the demands of near or far
military theatres. 30 In short, the MRTT is a multi-use cog in a complex
air-defense infrastructural wheel.' 3' From Airbus, a contractor whose
central design philosophy is commonality-i.e., manufacturing related
124. Airbus Media, Military Programs, available at: http://www.airbus.com/media/
airbusmilitary.asp (last visited Sept. 28, 2004).
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. See Lufthansa-Technik, AG, Media Page, Erster Airbus A31Oftir Luftbetankung
Vorgestellt (First Airbus A3 10 for Aerial Refueling Introduced) (Dec. 9, 2003), available
at http://www.lufthansatechnik.com/applications/portal/lhtportal/portlets/
searchResultPortlet/resolve.jsp?id=3b4290b8843482f8e0e 1 5e31 d9bf59fa78e4144e0c44a
fc501d5accefdccd99e938953bcc94f82558d0b4256804e5893 (last visited Sept. 25, 2004.)
128. Id. Boeing News Releases, Deborah Bosick, Boeing's 767 Tanker Aircraft
Delivers More of Everything (July 17, 2003), available at http://www.boeing.com/
news/releases/2003/q3 /nr_030717b.html (last visited Apr. 2, 2004).
129. The A-310 is a mid-range aircraft flying roughly 5,200 nautical miles with lower
fuel-hauling capacity; the A-330 is a longer-range aircraft of up to 6,500 nautical miles
with higher payload-carrying capacity. See Airbus Aircraft Families, available at
http://www.airbus.com/product/a300_a310_backgrounder.asp (last visited Sept. 28,
2004).
130. Id.
131. Maj. Thomas L. Gibson, The Death of "Superman": The Case Against
Specialized Tanker Aircraft in the USAF (June 2002) (unpublished thesis, School of
Advanced Air Power Studies, Maxwell A.F) (on file with the author) (arguing that the
Air Force should move away from single-use tanker aircraft toward "multi-role"
platforms like the MRTT, in reconnaissance, medevac, or other configurations, with the
refueling function relegated to a supplemental or secondary role. Major Gibson was,
himself, a tanker aircraft pilot, and though not fully endorsing procurement of either the
MRTT or KC-767, his thesis also fails to account for the multiple variants in which
MRTT is currently available. Nevertheless, in the author's opinion, his comprehensive,
well-thought study on the infrastructural role of multi-role tanker transports is persuasive
and should have driven procurement policy.)
[Vol. 23:2
THE BOEING 767 TANKER BOONDOGGLE
"families" of aircraft-this is not a particularly innovative developmental
step. 132
2. Directly Competitive Process in the U.K.
In stark contrast to the way the Boeing 767 tanker competition was
mismanaged in the United States, the process of procuring tanker aircraft
in the United Kingdom was, like the JSF procurement process, managed
with greater candor in a direct competition. 133 Hoping to sell its KC-767
to the British Government as well as to other former British
Commonwealth states such as Australia, Boeing competed directly
against EADS's MRTT for the contract.' 3 4 Britain initiated the Future
Strategic Tanker Aircraft (FSTA) Programme in 1997, to study and make
recommendations for replacing outdated Royal Air Force VC10 and
Lockheed TriStar tankers.135 The British Ministry of Defence invited
Boeing to submit a request for information (RFI) at the Programme's
outset, which was followed by an Invitation to Submit Outline Proposals
(ISOP). 136  An Invitation to Negotiate followed to two primary
"consortia" in December 2000, with Boeing and EADS submitting
formal bids in July 2001.'7 Final bids followed in late April 2003.138
In the interim, questions about the viability of Boeing's 767-tanker
program, as well as its lack of "multi-role" suitability, inevitably intruded
into the United Kingdom's selection process. 139 In November 2003, with
the full panoply of the scandal playing out in the American press, and the
132. Boeing's counterargument would likely be that it has also put a high value on
commonality in its commercial airplanes, in such models as the 757 and 767 in particular;
however, in that respect, it followed Airbus's lead. Boeing's other argument would likely
be that it simply produces a more reliable, comfortable and serviceable commercial
airplane with greater dispatch reliability, which is a good argument but beside the point.
Boeing's quality of individual design has always been quite high: the process of relating
individual designs to multiple use roles and an integrated whole-for procurement
efficiencies-is clearly Airbus's trademark rather than Boeing's.
133. By way of contrast, the playing field in the U.S. for EADS was never level, with
its lower-priced competitive offer to build MRTT for the United States directly
undermined by the Pentagon. See Merle and Markon, supra note 2.
134. Robert Wall and Douglas Barrie, Refueling Rivalries, AVIATION WEEK & SPACE
TECH., Apr. 26, 2004.
135. See Royal Air Force, News, available at http://www.raf.mod.uk/news/
newsjan04_04.html (last visited Mar. 21, 2004).
136. See Ministry of Defence, Projects, available at http://www.mod.uk/
dpa/projects/FSTADetail.htm (last visited Apr. 24, 2004).
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Rich Tuttle, EADS Eyes U.K. Tanker Work as it Rolls Out MRTT Aircraft, 49
Aerospace Daily 1, 3 (2003) (noting that, "Boeing's prospects in the U.K. competition
appear to have dimmed since two executives were fired for apparent conflict of interest in
a potential $18 billion U.S. Air Force deal to lease 20 and buy 80 767 tankers").
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767 tanker proposal dead in the water in the U. S. Congress, experts
appeared to agree that Boeing's "backfir[ing] hard-ball tactics"' 140 in the
United States had effectively made the Ministry of Defence's selection of
the EADS Airbus derivative a virtual fait accompli.141 In contrast to the
so-called "competitive" bidding process between EADS and Boeing in
the U.S.-tainted by conflict-of-interest-riddled mismanagement and
violations of the Procurement Integrity Act n24-the U.K. competition was
tipped by Boeing's own scandal-ridden executive suite.
43
Therefore, in January 2004, Boeing lost the contract-valued at
approximately £13 billion-with the British Ministry of Defence
awarding it instead to EADS, despite a direct appeal to Prime Minister
Blair by President Bush on Boeing's behalf.144 In April 2004, the
Australian government followed suit, opting for the MRTT in a contract
deal valued at approximately $2 billion (Australian).145 The Canadian
and German governments also committed to order the plane. 146
IV. Conclusion
The long-range effects of Boeing's full-court press to sell U.S.
taxpayers the KC-767 deal are yet unknown. In some respects, it is still
too early to tell because events continue to unfold. However, with the
loss of sales to the British, Australian, Canadian, and German
governments, Boeing's corporate misdeeds have dealt a serious blow to
its proposal to widely market the KC-767 internationally. Although it
has commitments from both the Italian and Japanese governments, the
tanker program appears to be in real jeopardy in the United States, with
talk that EADS may yet win a contract with the Americans.1 47 This
much is clear, however: Boeing's troubles will not merely cost it the
140. Hedges, supra note 46, at 13.
141. Tuttle, supra note 139.
142. Merle and Markon, supra note 2.
143. Mary Fagan, Bush Backs BAE in Air Tanker Dogfight, THE SUNDAY TELEGRAPH
(LONDON), Nov. 16, 2003, at 1. See also Tuttle, supra note 139 (suggesting further that
the scandal in the United States was a "10 percent" determinative factor in Boeing's
losing the contract award along with EADS's superior multi-role concept where-
otherwise-both aircraft proposals were extremely competitive.)
144. Tuttle, supra note 139.
145. Fagan, supra note 143.
146. Tuttle, supra note 139 (noting that, "Boeing's prospects in the U.K. competition
appear to have dimmed since two executives were fired for apparent conflict of interest in
a potential $18 billion U.S. Air Force deal to lease 20 and buy 80 767 tankers.")
147. Stephen J. Hedges, Audit Urges a Hold on Boeing Deal, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 1,
2004, at C12 (in which Secretary of the Air Force James Roche indicates he would
"welcome an [alternate] bid by Airbus if Pentagon leaders decide to scrap the Boeing
contract."); Suzanne D. Patrick: The Defense Industrial Base: Myth vs. Reality,
AVIATION WEEK & SPACE TECH., (Sept. 13, 2004) (where the Undersecretary of Defense
for Industrial Policy indicates EADS' tanker proposal will now be "welcome").
[Vol. 23:2
THE BOEING 767 TANKER BOONDOGGLE
KC-767 contract in the United States. To the contrary, it has already lost
billions of international dollars by attempting to suppress international
competition at home, abusing its advantage with the Pentagon, Congress,
and White House.
More importantly, its American operations have been seriously
damaged. In particular, three of its commercial facilities in Wichita,
Kansas and in Tulsa and McAlester, Oklahoma, may be sold with the
KC-767 contract in jeopardy. 148  Boeing, which has used the
"internationalized" nature of the "systems-integrated" aircraft
manufacturing and subcontracting processes to pressure its unions for
concessions, will jeopardize its workforce by failing to account for the
"internationalized" implications of its own conduct. 1
49
A. A Disciplined, Infrastructurally-Supported Production and
Procurement Regime is Already a Stated DOD Goal and, In Fact,
the Law.
In the final analysis, an infrastructural approach to procurement is
not merely a good idea; to the contrary, it is both a stated goal of the
Department of Defense and it is already law.' 50 The deficiencies of the
B-2 and A-12 scandals were, in fact, instructive, paving the way for
Congressional mandates that the Department of Defense ensure
"interoperability" of acquisitions. Here, the process devolved for several
reasons, not the least of which was the political will to get the Boeing
deal done despite its legal defects.' 5'
Strategic aircraft procurement, however, must be conceived not only
along cost containment lines and "interoperability." The goal, in
addition, must be focused integration, with a view toward making the
most of research and development design commonalities, emphasizing
the subordinated role of the individual airplane to the needs of the total
air defense fleet. These goals are consistent with cost containment, even
with direct government support for research and development as the JSF
project proved. Ultimately, the KC-767 contract process has been a
throw back to the days of purpose-specific fleet planning and use-
148. Fagan, supra note 143. See also Tuttle, supra note 139.
149. Tuttle, supra note 139.
150. 10 U.S.C. § 118 (2004).
151. Representative Norm Dicks and Alaskan Senator Ted Stevens, in particular,
remain undeterred in pressing the cause of the KC-767 tanker deal, whatever the DOD's
Inspector General's recommendations. Further, there is a recent move in Congress to
block international competition from EADS, despite its commitment to assemble and
retrofit its MRTT product in the United States. Andrew Doyle, Defence Graham
Warwick/Washington DC Fresh Doubt Raised Over USAF Tanker Procurement Remains
on Hold Pending Investigation, FLIGHT INTERNATIONAL, Apr. 6, 2004, at 8.
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specific fleet procurement, an approach whose time has long since come
and gone.
152
B. A Disciplined, Multi-Role Production and Procurement Regime with
the KC- 767 Would Have Served Boeing's Corporate Interests by
Making it a More Competitive International Contractor
Boeing, the beneficiary of huge tax incentives to build its 7E7, has
the most powerful of corporate friends. Its prowess in procuring
questionably ethical favors from Congress, the White House, and state
governments in the wake of its "eclipse by Airbus ' 53 as the world's
leading manufacturer of commercial airplanes, has made Boeing a target
for particularly harsh criticism.154  Such criticism, moreover, is
warranted. To expect the American taxpayer to foot the bill for Boeing's
shortsighted competitive vision makes little sense.
Boeing certainly understood that a contract scandal in the United
States could have far-reaching, international implications; from the
outset, the KC-767 program had been designed to gamer not only sales
in the United States, but also additional sales abroad. 55 According to
some experts, Boeing has been skimping on research and development
for years in favor of acquisitions and fatter corporate profits. 56 Others
have hypothesized that Boeing became "overconfident," specifically
because it knew its friends in high places would come to its aid.' 57 In a
Republican administration that emphasizes individual responsibility; that
wants to trim the funding of social programs; and touts the inherent value
of the free-enterprise158 laissez-faire American free market, corporate
dependence is hypocritical enough. Where criminality attends such
152. Airbus Aircraft Families, supra note 134.
153. Robert Samuelson, Boeing's Rapid Descent, THE WASH. POST, June 26, 2003, at
A29 (calling Boeing's "eclipse by Airbus" as the world's largest commercial airplane
manufacturer "one of the most fascinating and momentous business stories of our time,"
precipitated by a combination of "bad luck, bad management and bad government
policy." Samuelson attributes Airbus' rise with commercial airplane users-airlines-to
its commitment to commonalities of design across its entire product line.).
154. Jay Hancock, Boeing Takes Its Turn at the Corporate Welfare Trough, THE
BALTIMORE SUN, June 29, 2003, at ID (calling Boeing a "whiny corporation" whose
insistence on "tilt[ing] the business playground maim[s] pledges of equal treatment under
the law").
155. Guse, supra note 27, at 8.
156. Samuelson, supra note 153 (quoting Teal Group consultant Richard Aoulafia,
who commented that Boeing had, until the launch of the 7E7, decided to take a "product-
development holiday for the last eight years").
157. Id.
158. Tom Pelton, EPA Report Faults Bush on Air Pollution Policies, THE BALTIMORE
SuN, (Oct 1, 2004) at 3A (attributing the Bush Administration's "cap and trade" pollution
credit trading program to its emphasis on "free market policies").
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corporate-government codependence, however, and the official response
is to close American markets to foreign competition to foster even
greater dependence on the State, we have indeed reached the point of
"Soviet style economic planning."' 5 9
To use the words of that unnamed U.S. trade official cited above,
Boeing "is a grown-up company that has" nearly "50 per cent of the
market."' 160 While there may be a "reason why the government needs to
subsidise it,' 16 1 such subsidies should be granted with full candor, as in
Europe. Shoring up Boeing's flagging research and development is not
something the United States government can realistically achieve on the
sly, nor can state governments, as Hancock points out, afford the fiscal
"sophistry" of granting huge tax incentives to corporations like Boeing in
the hopes of gaining jobs and economic "spinoff."'
162
In the end, Boeing's lax product development and short-term profit
orientation, coupled with its confidence that a huge infusion of
congressionally authorized Pentagon cash was virtually guaranteed,
made it a less competitive bidder. Ironically, its corporate dominance
and lack of free-market tenacity and ingenuity cost it and the U.S.
economy billions in the international military marketplace. Boeing has
fallen behind Airbus in the commercial airplane business, betting on its
next "big gamble," the 7E7.163 Though Boeing recently announced an
initial order by All Nippon Airways for 50 of the luxury jets, it is too
early to tell whether its gamble on the 7E7 will pay off. 164 The airplane's
major selling points are flight-deck commonality with other Boeing
products, a humidity-controlled environment for increased passenger
comfort, and 20% fuel economy with lightening of the aircraft through
the extensive use of composites. 1
65
The U.S. taxpayer, however, should not be hedging Boeing's bets,
particularly without full public disclosure. The lack of candor about the
tanker deal's hidden benefits to Boeing-very much like Lockheed's
lack of candor in the McDonnell-Douglas C-17 scandal-have sabotaged
its own efforts to widely market the tanker proposal to foreign
159. Hancock, supra note 154.
160. THE AUSTRALIAN, supra note 117.
161. Id.
162. Hancock, supra note 154. See also Wallace, supra note 114 (the purported
preservation of jobs comes at an unacceptably high price: for instance, tax concessions
recently afforded Boeing to keep its new 7E7 airliner in Everett during the development
and marketing phase-to the tune of $3.2 billion-have been calculated to cost
Washington state taxpayers some $2.67 million per estimated conserved job).
163. Samuelson, supra note 153.
164. Melissa Allison, 50-plane Order Gets Boeing 7E7 Off Ground, CHI. TRIB., Apr.
27, 2004, at Cl.
165. THE AUSTRALIAN, supra note 117.
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governments. Furthermore, disguised rescue attempts are not in
Boeing's own interests: if the KC-767 scandal proves anything, it
demonstrates that when complacency is rewarded, there is little incentive
to innovate.
V. Post-Script
In the months since the original draft of this article was completed,
events surrounding the 767-tanker contract deal have continued to
unfold. The controversy refuses to die. Ms. Druyun, facing an August
sentencing proceeding in her conspiracy prosecution, cooperated with the
U.S. Attorney and provided federal investigators with extensive
information on a conflict-riddled federal defense contracting hierarchy.
66
In early June 2004, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld declined to
release pertinent documents about the proposed aircraft sale to the
Senate. 167 The White House, however, eventually capitulated.
168
Later in June, moreover, The New York Times revealed that two
members of the Defense Policy Board, the "quasi-governmental" agency
that advises the Secretary on military acquisitions, were hired by Boeing
as consultants at the same time the tanker deal was being sold to the Air
Force. 169 The Project on Government Oversight's report, revealing that
224 senior federal officials and members of Congress had worked for
powerful defense contracting interests or corporations over the past
seven years, sparked a Washington Post report the same day.
170
Two weeks earlier, Boeing was nevertheless awarded a lucrative $4
billion contract to build the "next generation" submarine-hunting aircraft,
the MMA (multi-mission maritime aircraft) based, predictably, on one of
its more popular commercial airframes, the 737-800.' Despite the legal
defects and public relations challenges inherent in and mounted against
the 767-tanker deal, Boeing's resolve to cross-pollinate its sagging
commercial airplane sales with military contracting dollars eventually
166. Leslie Wayne, An Anxious Time for Boeing as Fired Worker Starts to Talk, N.Y.
TIMES, June 16, 2004, at C1.
167. Joseph L. Galloway, Rumsfeld to Restrict Senators' Access to Documents in
Boeing Deal, KNIGHT RIDDER WASHINGTON BUREAU, June 4, 2004, at K4524.
168. Amy Klamper, White House May Provide Tanker Documents to Senate Panel,
July 9, 2004, available at http://nationaljournal.com/pubs/congressdaily/.
169. Leslie Wayne, Pentagon Brass and Military Contractors' Gold, N.Y. TIMES,
June 29, 2004, at C1.
170. Renae Merle, Report Examines Defense Hiring: 224 Ex-Federal Officials
Worked for Contractors in Past Seven Years, THE WASHINGTON POST, June 29, 2004, at
E02.
171. Boeing Wins Navy Aircraft Bid, L.A. TIMES, June 15, 2004, at C3 (quoting
Congressman Norman Dicks who praised the deal with Boeing as offering the Navy an
aircraft, in the 737-800, with greater speed and flexibility).
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succeeded. With the tanker proposal still dormant-the lease deal, as
originally structured, is effectively dead, though Boeing announced in
mid-October that it still expects to build 100 KC-767 for the Air Force-
it seems likely Boeing will still have its corporate way with the
Congress, though for a far smaller price tag this time. 172
172. Renee Merle, Boeing Expects Air Force Contract: Firm Looks to Sell, Not
Lease, Tankers, THE WASHINGTON POST, Oct. 12, 2004 at E0 1.
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